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From: Jonathan Paisley <Jonathan_Pais
To: Daniel O'Leary <Daniel_O'Leary@
Subject: Re: Quadra.Net
Date:Fri, February 27, 1998 08:44 PM


DO> *All* of its features to disable imterrupt, restart and so on are easily
DO> defeated by:1 . Pulling the power plug2. Holding down the shift key3.
DO> Reapplying power to disable loading. 4. Removing the Machine Lock
DO> extension from the Extensions folder. 5. Rebooting the mac in the normal
DO> way.

How about if Machine Lock completely disables the usage of the shift key at startup?


DO> ANY Mac user with basic experience knows to attempt this method to bypass
DO> extension-type lockouts. Again, I stand by my original statements that
DO> security measures must be built-into the OS rather than tacked on as
DO> applications to be truly effective. Another way of defeating this method
DO> involves booting the CPU from another disk with an operating system, and
DO> then mounting the "locked-out" disk for attack.

I don't deny this Daniel, but Machine Lock is at least a start to prevent nosy people from taking a casual look at the server. People who want to do serious damage etc can ALWAYS pull the plug--on any computer (without UPS!). If people are seriously converned about local access security, the phyiscal computer should be physically secured.

DO> 1. REAL security measures include the ability to totally protect files and
DO> directories from reading, listing as being written to, linked to, or
DO> otherwise modified. Other than the permissions within AppleShare, there
DO> is no method within the MacOS to do this other than locking and hiding
DO> files. Locking can be undone from the Finder on a local machine, and
DO> hiding can be undone with many utilities. Therefore, disabling control of
DO> the screen and keyboard I/O are used to prevent access to the Finder. If
DO> files are not encrypted then they are accessible by defeating the lockout
DO> as I described above, and plainly readible.

DO> If file/directory permissions, access control lists, and in-process
DO> encryption, were implemented INTO THE O/S, the system would be MUCH MORE
DO> SECURE from this type of an attack. Attempting to tack it on via an
DO> application is a doomed proposition which further complicates other OS
DO> operations such as file recovery in the event of a crash.

Yes, but don't shout at me.

;)



DO> 2. REAL security proviodes means to restrict program execution of system
DO> processes by their owner and also limits monitoring of such processes so
DO> that data is not revealed by "sniffing" the system.

The more observant readers will notice that you are a UNIX man, Daniel. In all your wise ideas, why not point out that this is how a UNIX system operates, and be done with it? Or, get a UNIX system and do away with the Mac, which will doubtedly ever have a fully secure operating system. Although, do remember that UNIX's security was added as an afterthought.

DO> The MacOS does NOT implement the concept of process ownership and is
DO> therefore susceptible to attacks designed to tap into or hi-jack running
DO> processes. Fortunately not many people currently know how to do this, but
DO> tools for learning about the processes running on a CPU and what data is
DO> involved in their operation do exist and can be used to break system
DO> security.

Errm, excuse me. Please explain what you mean. I get the feeling that what you have written here is just designed to scare people. From an experienced Macintosh programmer, 'tapping into' and 'hi-jacking' running process is absolute nonsense.



Please don't take offense, but I feel you are exaggerating the problem somewhat.

Regards,

Jonathan Paisley, Sysop Highlander BBS
Developer of MaxTF Utilities
Modem: (+44) 141 561 7225
Internet: bbs.highlander.net.uk [TF/User and Telnet, both port 1474]
WWW: http://www.highlander.net.uk/
mailto: jonathan_paisley@highlander.net.uk


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